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## INVESTIGATING THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE TENDENCY TO POLITICAL VIOLENT BEHAVIORS IN THE BALUCHISTAN REGION OF IRAN (CASE STUDY: SARAVAN CITY)

## INVESTIGANDO OS FATORES QUE AFETAM A TENDÊNCIA A COMPORTAMENTOS POLITICAMENTE VIOLENTOS NA REGIÃO DO BALUCHISTÃO DO IRÃ (ESTUDO DE CASO: SARAVAN CITY)

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Received: 01/05/21

Accepted: 15/05/21

Published: 19/05/21

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**Abstract:** Political violence can be defined as a form of violence that is subject to political power, whether it is to achieve power, whether to protest, or to eliminate a power and to maintain and sustain a given power. In this general sense, political violence can be separated from the natural meaning of violence, because the power of the center and the ventricle lies in virtually all forms of violence. In other words, violence can be attributed to a kind of physical force and pressure from an institution, an individual or a group over an institution, an individual or another group, in order to force that institution or individuals to do something contrary to their will. Hence, violence is always against desire, will and freedom, and somehow defines its limits. However, given the fact that the freedom of an individual can be precisely at the opposite point in the freedom of another person. By dividing the independent variables of research into 6 factors of religious discrimination, the use of non-native forces, the use of foreign media, participation in elections, political activity, and religious intolerance, it was observed that the impact of the dimensions of the use of foreign media, participation in Elections, political activity, and religious intolerance are meaningful in terms of political violence and can have an impact on the spread of political violence in the region.

**Keywords:** Religious discrimination. Use of non-native forces. Use of foreign media. Participation in elections. Political activity. Religious intolerance. Violent political behaviour.

**Resumo:** A violência política pode ser definida como uma forma de violência que está sujeita ao poder político, seja para alcançar o poder, seja para protestar, seja para eliminar um poder e manter e sustentar um determinado poder. Neste sentido geral, a violência política pode ser separada do significado natural da violência, porque o poder do centro e do ventrículo está em praticamente todas as formas de violência. Em outras palavras, a violência pode ser atribuída a um tipo de força física e pressão de uma instituição, um indivíduo ou grupo sobre uma instituição, um indivíduo ou outro grupo, a fim de forçar essa instituição ou indivíduos a fazer algo contrário à sua vontade. Portanto, a violência é sempre contra o desejo, a vontade e a liberdade, e de alguma forma define seus limites. Entretanto, dado o fato de que a

liberdade de um indivíduo pode estar precisamente no ponto oposto na liberdade de outra pessoa. Ao dividir as variáveis independentes da pesquisa em 6 fatores de discriminação religiosa, o uso de forças não nativas, o uso de mídia estrangeira, a participação em eleições, a atividade política e a intolerância religiosa, foi observado que o impacto das dimensões do uso de mídia estrangeira, a participação em eleições, a atividade política e a intolerância religiosa são significativas em termos de violência política e podem ter um impacto na disseminação da violência política na região.

Palavras-chave: Discriminação religiosa. Uso de forças não nativas. Uso de mídia estrangeira. Participação em eleições. Atividade política. Intolerância religiosa. Comportamento político violento.

## Introduction

In the discussion of violent political behavior, the question is always raised, what is the root of political violence? And what factors lead to violent political behavior? There are several theories in answering these questions. One is the theory of social learning theory that the main idea of this approach is that the behavior of a person is a product of his previous learning. In this regard, according to Bandura, the violent behavior of the goods has a mimicry aspect and is acquired through observation and cannot have an inherent basis (Karimi, 1994: 219). Bührgerman also emphasizes the role of individual factors in explaining the possibility of violent behavior, and argues that in families whose members are aggressively exposed during childhood, there is a greater likelihood of violent behavior or more (Darwishpour, 1999: 51).

But Arnson believes that violent behavior can be the result of any unpleasant or distressing situation, such as anger and pain, but the most important factor in violent behavior is among all the failure factors. If one fails to achieve his goal, failure can increase the likelihood of violent behavior (Arnson, 2006: 289). Therefore, according to the motivational theorists, failure is a major cause of violent behavior that creates a state of arousal or cravings in a person that appears in the presence of appropriate symbols. Consequently, for control, we have to think of ways that can reduce the failure (Karimi, 1994: 226).

Resource Theory is another approach that William Good has put forward about violent behavior. According to this theory, the family system, like any other system or entity, has an authority system, and anyone who has more important family resources than others can bring other members into their desires. He also argued that resources such as position, social status, personal base outside the family, occupation, political authority, etc., affect the power of family members, as different social classes and ethnic groups differ in access to alternative sources. .

Therefore, members of the lower classes may be more likely to use violent behaviors as a means of gaining power in the family than the other classes (Burghata, 1992: 461).

Finally, Coser argues that when people do not have channels and channels to express complaints, and if there is no possibility of moving to higher social levels (social mobility) for members, the possibility of non-legitimacy will increase. Here, Coser is inspired by Marx's views on relative deprivation. As Marx has shown, and as some empirical research has proved, absolute deprivation cannot always produce a revolution. When people expect a better future, they suddenly come to the streets to realize these expectations; then they are raised enough to create contradictions.

The level of arousal, in fact, is influenced by their obligations to the existing system, the degree to which they develop their strong inner pressures and the nature and extent of social control in the system. Accordingly, the reasons for violent behavior from Cozer's point of view are: a) limited channels for expressing and expressing complaints and dissatisfaction with the hub (low rates of mobility towards more privileged positions). Cozer has pointed out that it is not the opposite of what threatens social fabrication, but the difficulty and lack of flexibility of the social system that creates hostility. In other words, hostility comes from a lack of flexibility in the social system, a concept that is different from hostility is a factor of incompatibility in the social system (Azad, 2002: 97).

Weber believed that human behavior should be studied in the context of the mental and objective framework that they were created. From Weber's point of view, sociology does not succeed in understanding the system of beliefs and behavior of societies; rather, it seeks out how events are manifested and shows that a particular method of belief determines how it works (Weber, 1978: 66-67).

Political behavior in that it involves political participation; it can include its implications. If political participation is used in the meaning of "behavior that affects or intends to affect government outcomes." The definition of political participation is "any voluntary action, successful or unsuccessful, organized or unorganized, periodically or continuously, including legitimate and illegitimate methods for influencing the election of leaders, policies and public affairs at any level of local or national government. "There are two important thoughts about the nature of political participation. The first idea, participation in voluntary, selective and legal features is only in the liberal democratic framework. According to this theory, organized

demonstrations and election campaigns are far from genuine participation, because true participation is a bottom-up stream that influences government policies and affects politics. The second thinking involves engaging with a reminder of the efforts of the people in any political system to be effective. This thinking separates participation from democratic systems, while it has the nature of illegal characteristics. In fact, this kind of thinking considers the nature of participation to be neutral in its value, which has a wider scope of participation in the first thought and can embrace all kinds of acts (Mosaffa, 1996: 21).

In general, in this study, the forms of political behavior are emphasized on violent political behavior: violent political behavior, which is an uncontrolled armed struggle. This kind of behavior leads to political violence, which, according to the definition of GAR, includes all mass attacks against the political regime, its actors or its policies. Indicators of this behavior include secret gathering and organization, violent protests along with looting and burning, guerrilla warfare, rebellion and armed operations. In connection with violent behavior, Hanna Arendt says: "Violence is effective because of its instrumental nature, to the extent that it is reasonable to justify the use of violence. Because, when we start, we never know for sure the final result; therefore, violence is only conditional upon the pursuit of short-term goals. Violence does not help the great affairs; whether it is history, whether revolution, whether it is progress or reaction, but it can make dramatic feelings of discomfort and draw public attention ... tactics of violence and disturbance, It may be beneficial to achieving short-term goals; therefore, the likelihood of the violence falling victim to the achievement of long-term goals, such as fundamental change, is weaker "(Arndt, 1980: 115).

In this regard, as evidenced by historical evidence, Iran has never lived in a single people for the past five thousand years, but has always lived in different parts of the country. The causes of this ethnic diversity in Iran and the world are due to the nature of the human being, which has physical and cultural dimensions. Having this diversity can naturally include one or more components. What is seen in the current developments in Iran is that diversities have sometimes intensified some confrontations, conflicts and crises. In many cases, differences have also been instrumental in strengthening intellectual interaction, mutual recognition, transformations, and impacts, and ultimately national evolution. Therefore, diversity in Iran includes a wide range of religious, ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity. The intrinsic nature and originality of these diversions have given Iran a special position, which has led foreigners to seek the interests of the

land and influence their history and geography. On the other hand, the south-east of the country, especially the Sistan and Baluchestan Province, is one of the provinces whose ethnic and linguistic gaps are parallel to the religious divide and which, by strengthening and actualizing each other, increases the probability of activation and security consequences as well as violent political behaviors.

In this regard, in general, before the Islamic Revolution of Iran, political efforts in the region were largely secular and more focused on ethnic aspirations, while benefiting from the support and guidance of foreign countries, especially Iraq. On the other hand, with the understanding of such a situation, the regime was able to identify and control the three influential components of such efforts; these three components were Khan or Sardars (lords), drug trafficking and the third factor of intellectuals, Marxist. Thus, in the years before the revolution, although there were fundamental gaps between the Baluch people and the sovereignty, they did not bring serious moves against sovereignty due to regime policies and internal conditions.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, political and religious activities quickly began in Balochistan and placed the Baloch people on the verge of new developments. On the one hand, the interim government, to some extent, activated the Baluchis in the political affairs of the region and increased the extent of their participation in the regional affairs administration, so that Dr. Naqi Nouri, a university professor, arrived at the governorate of Sistan and Baluchistan, and a person named Gomsadashi Director Many Baloch intellectuals were also assigned to other important positions and positions. Furthermore, the nature of the revolutionary clan, by compromising the power and authority of the clan, led them to escape from the region to Balochistan of Pakistan. These changes quickly triggered that Sunni clerics gradually turned themselves into religious movement leaders and raised demands such as equal and equal rights in the sovereignty. So, in short, these new developments included: increasing the presence of intellectuals in the sovereignty, undermining the influence of the Sardar and increasing the authority of the Sunni clergy in the social pyramid. With this introduction, it seems that the political movements organized after the revolution could be identified as four distinctly distinct stages and list the features for each of them.

The first stage was the first effective steps that illustrated the divide between sovereignty and the Baluch people. As the groups and parties thrived in the country, a group of Rumi of the

region began to establish a party called the Union of Muslims in Zahedan. The leader of this party was Maulavi Abdul Aziz Mullazehi (Mullazadeh). He was the patron saint of the Sunni region and he enjoyed a degree of influence among the people and the Rumi. The goals and positions of this party included local and ethnic demands, such as the assignment of posts to indigenous people and the granting of autonomy to the Baluch people, but the main purpose was to prevent any rules and regulations in Sunni areas that were contrary to Sunni principles and beliefs. Following the founding of the party, Sunni leaders of the region clearly expressed their opposition to the twelfth principle of the draft constitution, namely, the recognition of the Shi'a religion in the country, as well as the condition of the Shiite president. This provided a favorable context for the participation of Baloch in the election of constitutional experts. Sunni representatives of the Assembly of Experts did not disagree with the Assembly on some of the principles of the constitution, and in order to fulfill their demands, they are subjecting the subject more than ever to public opinion and want to make a statement about it (Farahani, 2007: 67).

The second phase after the Eidgah Incident shows itself in other ways in the movements and political activities of the Baluch people. The Sardarians, who enjoyed a great influence in the social and political structure, leave the country, and some of them set up their political activities in an organized manner with the help of some countries. Iraq, through its historical influence, the region (the establishment of the Baluchestan Liberation Front) formed a new organization called the Baloch Unity Conflict by Juma' Khan Baloch, a founder of the Liberation Front, and Mir Mowladad Moradzehi is one of the most influential commanders of the region. Together, the two collaborated with Qanin to organize their activities in the name of gaining the lost rights of the Baloch people, securing the national tribal eloquence of Balochistan and forcing the Islamic Republic to give autonomy within the framework of a federal government, and at the beginning of the year 60 The Baloch Unity Front is announced. Strong disagreements over the distribution of donations from Iraq and the National Resistance Movement make it possible, in March 1985, that Mir Mowladad Moradzehi was dismissed from head the Front in order that it can be managed by a council, but the new situation did not last long. And with the direct intervention of Iraq, it began the movement of the Mujahideen of Baluchestan of Iran (Jamba) from within this front. With the election of Mohammad Khan Mir Lashari, led by the movement, the military activity of the movement actually began from the second half of 1985.

The Balochistan movement's goal is to declare gunfire policy. Baluchi's language as an official language and the fight against corruption are among the most important programs of the autonomous state. In the years 1985 and 1980, which is the culmination of the movement, members of the movement were able to inflict damages on state facilities and facilities. At the same time as the Persian Gulf War and the lack of service of Iraqi officers to the movement, the dissolution was announced. At this stage of political movements, the presence of readers at the head of the two organizations was the main concerns raised by ethnic and cultural issues, and emphasized on these gaps. Moreover, these movements could not have accompanied the masses of the Baluch people because, on the one hand, they were clearly visible in their affiliation with foreign powers, and on the other hand, the Khans and Sardars lost their social status to some extent. Or at least they felt rivals at their side, which prevented them from succeeding. But these were not the rivals of the Rumi, who continued to advance in their course in this period without having to organize their activities in any organization or organization (Amini, 2007: 79).

The third stage, over the radical wing, has begun to form political parties and political organizations. Among the most important of these parties, the Sunni Mojahedin Organization, the Sunni Iranian Conservatives and the Al-Furqan Party of Iran have been named, one after another declaring existence. Slowly Meanwhile, the Mojahedin organization of the Sunni Iran is more ancient. The organization announces its goals to revive Islam and the Islamic community, and to fairly defend the rights of Sunni Iran and the world. The organization is establishing close ties with the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and, while strengthening the organization's military component, is also using its facilities and facilities. The organization also tries to establish contacts with prominent Rumi in Iran and to convey their ideas and ideas to them, which apparently do not succeed. About one year after the formation of the organization, with the aim of uniting the activities of various Baluchi groups based in Pakistan, a front under the name of the Supreme Council of Sunni Iran is announced. Organizations such as Sunni Mujahideen, Mojahedin-e-Baluchistan of Iran, Balochistan Movement of Iran etc. tried to intensify the struggle against the Islamic Republic of Iran by concentrating its capabilities and capabilities. The Supreme Council of the Sunni (Supreme Council of the Sunni) announced in 1369, with the election of Ali Akbar Mullahzadeh to his spokesman, formally announced in London. The Supreme Assembly was the first attempt to

unite the dissident Khans and Mowlavis to apparently bring the support of the Baluch people back.

In other words, the runaway commanders and rulers had come to the conclusion that in order to advance their goals, they had to promote their religious activities and, in fact, could benefit from the existing religious divide between the Baluch people and the sovereignty. At the end of this stage, it can be said that the formation of the Sunni Mujahedin organization on the one hand practically paved the Sunni rulers into a perfectly organized and organized system of political struggles; on the other hand, the formation of the Supreme Assembly established the close proximity between the two ethnic and religious fronts in Baluchestan. While these efforts were largely outsourced abroad, Mowlavis were also working in another way to address their political and religious demands. The peak of this kind of movement can be seen in the event of the so-called Makki mosque of Zahedan. After the destruction of the Feast of Mashhad Caravanserai, the Sunni clergy condemns the graveyard caravanserai grace and provides a good incentive on February 13, 1993, a number of people in the city, especially young Baluchi religious students, gathered at the Mecca Mosque to wreck the caravanserai in the hands of the government, and, with the closure of the shops, this protest takes on a widespread form, so that After a few hours of gathering in the mosque, the protesters have been demolishing some of the government's property and property and are engaging with law enforcement officers. It can be said that this was the second most protest movement of the Baloch people with religious motives in Baluchestan, which also took the color of violence (Kashkoli, 1999: 280).

The emergence of the Taliban in Nimroz Province of Afghanistan and the full support of the religious parties of Pakistan, especially the Muslim scholars, from this group, and against which the Iranian government supports the Taliban opposition, is creating the popularity and popularity of this group for the Sunni Baluch. Which is part of the dissatisfied Rumi of the government, are heavily opposed to the Taliban. In addition, the Taliban, by proclaiming the freedom to buy and sell narcotics in their occupied territories, have trafficked drug traffickers, mostly from Baluchi Iranians and led by them. The Baluchs commander puts their support under their umbrella. As a result, the alliance between the ethnic and religious movement at this stage, with the direct support of the Taliban group, is a newer form and provides a good basis for the emergence of violent acts.

The study of the post-revolutionary political developments among the Baluch people shows that in the first stage, unfortunately, the events led to violence. This was primarily due to the active presence of Sunni clerics in the political scene of the region, which gave rise to religious demands and political demands, and in the second place the political atmosphere of the country was such as to create a favorable environment for such events. Due to the fact that the fundamental changes in the structure of the ruling system of the ruling Baluch tribes did not arise, the conditions were partially backward and the political groups whose leaders were channeled were mostly organized by ethnic motives, but they could not bring the masses of the people with them. ; But after the Taliban in Afghanistan became strong and the religious affiliation between them and the Baluch people, the movements again became religious and made the existing gaps more active and tight. Consequently, the incidence of violent behavior also increased.

Therefore, it seems that in Iran, the ethnic and geopolitical features of the country, especially in border regions and marginal areas, have had a great influence on the formation and activity of terrorist groups and violent political behaviors. This influence is much more acute and more sensitive in southeastern Iran, especially in Sistan and Baluchestan. Indeed, it appears that some of the objective and subjective factors (ethnicity, role of foreign media, social and economic base, type of conception of religion, ideological beliefs, degree of closeness to borders, political participation) have the greatest influence on the formation of violent political behaviors in this southeastern of Iran.

Therefore, over the past few years, the southeastern region of Iran, especially Sistan-Baluchistan Province, has become a focal point of the crisis and foreign developments have also become the ground for intensifying this issue. On the other hand, the two governments of Iran and Pakistan spend capital and facilities to control the borders of the region, but so far satisfactory success has not been achieved. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out serious studies in the form of a library and a questionnaire in this regard. The present study seeks to investigate the violent political behaviors in the south-east of Iran, and especially in Sistan and Baluchestan Province.

Of course, in addition to psychological and mental factors, there are also other factors that refer to religious and ideological beliefs for the appearance of violent political behavior. Because some individuals and groups are being assassinated or abducted for insulting or ignoring

their values by an official or government officials. Although some scholars believe that the type of conception of religion and religiosity can be in the field of psychological factors. In this regard, the main issue of this research is the study of the effect of mental-psychological factors on violent political behaviors in Sistan and Baluchestan Province.

## Methodology

The present research employed survey study. The population of the study includes all citizens of Saravan Township. Saravan Township is one of the townships of Sistan and Baluchistan Province in Iran. The capital of this township is the city of Saravan. The population of the township, according to the census of 2006 is equal to 239,950 individuals. Further, the population of this township in 1996 was equal to 168,024. The majority of the people in Saravan are Sunnis and Baloches with more than 93 percent of the population. In Saravan, famous tribes such as Seyyed Zadeh, Nosrat Zehi, Yousefi, Dehghan, Amra', Hossein Bor, Raeisi, Bozorg Zadeh, Malek Zadeh, Dehvari, and etc. live.

## Results

Table 1. Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.427 <sup>a</sup>	0.183	0.168	0.89868

The table above summarizes the research model. The correlation coefficient between variables is 0.42, which shows that there is a relatively modest correlation between the independent variable set and the dependent variable of the research (political violence). But the value of the coefficient of determination, which is equal to 0.18, indicates that 18 percent of the total political violence among the citizens of the Saravan City is dependent on the six independent variables mentioned in this equation. In other words, the set of independent variables predicts and estimates the relatively low percentage of the variance of the variables of political violence.

Table 2. ANOVA<sup>a</sup> test

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	60.792	6	10.132	12.546	0.000 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	272.167	337	0.808		
	Total	332.959	343			

Moreover, given the significance of the value of the test f at the error level of less than 0.01, it can be concluded that the regression model of the research consists of 6 independent variables and a dependent variable, and a set of dependent variables can explain the changes in political violence.

Table 3. Coefficients of the regression effect

Coefficients <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	0.888	0.303		2.929	0.004
	Using non-native forces	0.118	0.063	0.120	1.858	0.064
	Using foreign media	0.274	0.066	0.219	4.126	0.000
	Participation in elections	-0.122	0.039	-0.163	-3.144	0.002
	Political activities	0.123	0.050	0.126	2.448	0.015
	Religious non-tolerance	0.175	0.065	0.145	2.685	0.008
	Feeling of religious discrimination	0.007	0.065	0.006	0.101	0.920

The above table shows the coefficients of the regression effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable. In this section, the interpretation of regression coefficients is based on the beta coefficient. Because these statistics indicate the standardized regression coefficient of each of the independent variables on the dependent variable (political violence). Therefore, it can be used to determine the relative contribution of each independent variable in the model. Comparison of variables shows that, firstly, the impact of the dimensions of using foreign media, participation in elections, political activity, and religious intolerance on political

violence is significant because the error level of  $t$  is less than 0.05, which is It indicates that the four variables affected the variables of political violence.

Second, while the variables of the use of foreign media, political activity, and religious intolerance have a positive impact on political violence, the impact of participation in elections on the level of political violence is negative. In other words, while the variables of using foreign media, political activity, and religious intolerance have increased political violence in the region, the number of political violence is diminished by increasing participation in elections. Third, the findings show that the use of foreign media has the most impact and changing sense of religious discrimination that has the least impact on the level of political violence.

## Conclusion

According to the social context of Saravan City of Balochistan, the results show that the impact of components of foreign media use, participation in elections, political activity, and religious intolerance is significant in terms of political violence, which indicates that four These variables have affected the variables of political violence. But while the variables of using foreign media, political activity, and religious intolerance have a positive impact on violent political behavior, the impact of participation in the election on the level of political violence is negative. Meanwhile, it seems to have the greatest impact on the tendency toward political violence related to the use of foreign media. It seems that some of the factors influencing the foreign media on the spread of the tendency to political violence are: 1. To promote religious and social constraints: One of the approaches of Farsi-speaking satellites is to neglect and reduce the religious and social constraints, therefore, Delinquent or disobedient to religious or social constraints. 2. Imagery of fake reality: Satellite programming does not pay much attention to their educational, educational, religious, and ethical aspects. Therefore, scenes of violent crimes, aggression, revenge and Convict offenses, but teenagers and those; 3. Manipulating audiences' perceptions: Watching satellites has an inevitable impact on all age groups. Therefore, the content of these programs has adverse effects on the perceptions and psychosociality of the audience and their realistic perception of "mental health" and "personality balance". 4. Simplification and Standardization of Crimes and Violence: Persian-language satellites simplify and standardize violent crimes and violent behavior, then they enter into the lives of many

families as part of daily routine; 5. False problem solving methods: Because some audiences imitate the interactions between film characters and solving problems observed on satellites, so examples of inappropriate social behaviors overwhelm public opinion and lead it to some kind of behavioral choice. Wrong thoughts. 6. Typically showing violence in the family: Satellites represent a victim of crime, crime between family members (in series and films), especially attributed to parents, causes displacement in the pattern of youth, thus causing a breakdown in family ties. 7. Teaching offenses: Satellites teach the techniques of committing crimes, make excruciating delight, promote prompt satisfaction, and persuade a person to reconcile with the perpetrator. 8. Creating a contrast between formal norms and false tendencies: Films and satellite serials between formal norms and false tendencies face a confrontation that ultimately leads to false tendencies of success and victory, resulting in failure of indicators of formal norms. 9. Advertising style and professional life style: By displaying violent and massive networks in family systems, they promote and promote the style and patterns of life in the modern world. 10. The Culture of Violence and Crimes: Exposure to horror and violence starts from the beginning and lasts throughout life. The new culture is saturated with the scenes of violence and horror produced by the satellites, and this is a rapidly unbelievable phenomenon presented as a part of culture to society and youth and threatens the security of society.

Moreover, considering the close link between violence and politics in Iran, contemplating the relationship between them today is a vital necessity. In the first impression, as the dynamism of politics in any society means reducing violence, the rise and spread of violence also means the end of politics. According to the findings of the research, it seems that this is the case with regard to participation in the elections. In other words, the results show that, to the extent that the turning point in the election is greater, citizens' tendency to political violence is reduced. But the findings of this study indicate that the relation between politics and violence is much more complicated than this initial perception. The concept of political violence in the political sciences reflects the complexity of the relationship between these two phenomena. The relationship between politics and violence has always been one of the most controversial issues in philosophy, because some scholars regard violence as the essence of political affairs. The essence of politics in this regard is the power category, and the basic rule of law can never be free from the appearance of violence. This is why, unlike the variable in the election, based on the results of the research, the increase of political activities, such as participation in political

speeches, the study of political newspapers, the study of political blogs, etc., has an adverse effect and raises The rate of political violence among citizens is being examined.

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